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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes bilateral bargaining in the sealed-bid double auction with 
bargaining costs. There exists a multiplicity of equilibria to this game, all of which have 
unsatisfactory properties. Since anything seems possible, we focus on the completely mixed 
strategy equilibria (C.:V!.S.) but find that such equilibria require that the negotiator with the 
higher bargaining cost receive higher profits. Allo\ving the bargaining process to be dynamic 
does not entirely solve _the p roblem because the offers in the dynamic game can demonstrate
chaotic behavior. :Vloreover \Vhen failure costs are lo\v there exist many infinite hori zon C.:VI.S. 
equilibria. One feature of the C .:M.S equilibrium is the existence of a significant probability of 
delay which is consistent \Vith e1npirical reality. Finally1 if there is asyn1n1etric infortnation 
over bargaining costs. the negotiator \Vith the higher bargaining costs obtains lo\ver profits. 
Thus, asymmetric cost information leads to more plausible properties for most bargaining 
equilibria. 
I. Introduction 
The Stahl-Rubinstein model of bargaining posits a game in which offers and counter­
offers are are tendered until an agreement is reached. The surplus over \Vhich the players are 
bargaining shrinks with successive offers--based on individual discount rates. In the perfect 
equilibrium of this ga1ne the player rnaking the first offer receives a potentially significant 
advantage and there are no bargaining failures--agreement occurs in the first period. The first 
period agreement result is frequently criticized from an empirical point of view due to the 
nun1erous observations of bargaining delays and failures (see, for example, Tracy [1986] and 
Card [1988]). In addition, it is hard to describe institutional arrangements in the field that 
allow for endogenous first mover advantages. Extensions to the Stahl-Rubinstein rnodel of 
bargaining where there is asymrnetric information concerning individual values or discount 
rates show that delays in agree1nents can occur (see Cho [1988]). Nonetheless, these 
bargaining "failures" are efficient because delay serves the purpose of infor1nation transmission. 
Delay allows for the separation of types provided that the discount rate is not arbitrarily close 
to one. 
To remedy the first mover advantage, analysts have investigated simultaneous rnove 
bargaining games. In particular, a sealed-bid double auction for bilateral trading has been 
developed and analyzed (see Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983], Chatteijee and Samuelson 
[1983], Leininger, Linhart, and Radner [1989], Satterthwaite and Williams [1989], and Broman 
[1989]). This mechanism is usually described as a game of inco1nplete information in \vhich the 
buyer and seller of an object simultaneously submit offers. There is asyminetric information 
about buyer's reservation price and the seller's cost of production. Trade occurs when the 
buyer's offer exceeds the seller's offer, and the price paid by the buyer is the average of the 
two offers. This mechanism has a multiplicity of Bayes-Nash equilibria, some with lo\V 
efficiency properties (see Leininger, Linhart and Radner [1989]). Thus, it seems that 
uncertainty concerning the players' valuations is enough to generate delay, failures, or other 
inefficiencies in bargaining. This paper cornplements this recent research of the sealed-bid 
double auction by i_ntroducing delay costs and multiple bargaining periods. 
We shall begin by analyzing the sealed-bid double auction with complete information. 
In addition, if the parties do not come to an agreement each must pay a cost of c> 0. The 
cost c can be interpreted as a direct loss out of current earnings from not agreeing. The cost 
becomes sunk if there is disagreement but can be avoided if the parties reach an accord. For 
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example, strikes are disadvantageous to both parties: the firm relinquishes profits and the 
workers loose income. In pretrial negotiations the plaintiff and defendant often pay incremental 
lawyer fees until a settlement is reached. A further empirical example of such institutions is 
analyzed in Rosenthal [1988] where owners of marshland contemplate draining the marsh and 
enjoying the returns to better pasture. For the marsh to be drained, however, the owners 
must agree on a rule to divide the surplus. Every tiine a proposal fails the O\vners collectively 
forego the rent to the surplus and pay legal fees to draw up a ne\v pi-oposal. In the dynamic 
version of this game, disagreen1ent does not affect the size of the surplus because all the cost of 
failure are borne incrementaly and out-of-pocket. 
The sealed-bid double auction ( under complete information) has a multiplicity of Nash 
equilibria and thus to make any headway we must confront the problem of equilibrium 
selection. We focus our attention on completely mixed strategy (C.l\.1 .S . )  equilibria since 
alternative selection criteria such as focal equilibria and tren1bling hand perfect equilibria are 
not robust 1n both payoffs and conjectures. Of course, when mixing is considered failure and 
delay become nontrivial and the expected value of the game is very sensitive to the underlying 
parameters of the bargaining environment. The next section \vill formally describe the 
bargaining model for the case of discrete values. Later sections will extend this model to both 
dynamic and incomplete information environ1nents. 
II. The One-Shot Game
The bargaining process can be reduced to the strategic interaction bet\.veen a buyer and 
a seller negotiating the terms of trade for an object. \/1/e assume the buyer has a reservation 
price of 1, and the seller's reservation price is 0. If the buyer and seller do not come to an 
agreement each will incur a cost of c>O. Notice that this game has a simple definition of 
efficient outcomes: trade occurs in the first period and joint profits are equal to 1. This model 
conforms to an agency model of bargaining where a union and management board negotiate a 
wage contract via intermediaries. Thus, we have a bilateral monopoly situation \vhere the 
players must solve a coordination problem \Vith short commitment. 
The sealed-bid double auction requires each player to simultaneouslv submit an offer 
price. Let s denote the offer price for the seller and b the offer price of the buyer. An 
agreement is reached if s�b. If an agreement is reached the settlen1ent price occurs half \Vay 
. ( b+s) . ( b+s)  between the offers, i.e., the seller receives --2- and the buyer receives 1---2 . If s>b, then 
the parties have not reached an agreement and each player pays c. The model presented 
4 
below can be extended to the case of multiple parties or where the settlement price is given by 
s + k(b-s) if b2:s and kE[O, l] . 
11.1 The Model
Suppose that buyer and seller offers are limited to a finite set "11. <;;; [0,1] . Without loss of 
generality, the elernents of l, denoted by zi, \vill be indexed from 0 to n such that zi = �, i.e., 
the offer grid is defined by {o, ft, �;, . ., �1, t} . Thus, the actions are given by the seller 
selecting a ziEl and the buyer selecting ZjE7L. The payoffs for the selier can thus be \Vritten 
as: 
-c 
if i:<Oj 
if i > j 
In a similar fashion we can describe the payoffs of the buyer as: 
CZ ·+ z )1- ' J 2 
-c 
if 
if 
< "- J 
>.i 
This payoff structure can easily be represented tn matrix form where the column index is the 
catalog of buyer offers and the row index is the catalog of seller offers. vVe shall denote the 
seller payoff matrix as JI.. In particular, A is a (n+ l) x (n+l) matrix with entries: 
(i+j) 
2ll 
-c 
for i :<Oj 
for i>j 
Similarly, the buyer payoff matrix (".B) is a (n+ l) x (n+ l) matrix with entries 
bij = 
(i+j)
1-� for i :<:=j 
bij = -c for i>j 
A strategy for the seller is a probability distribution over "11., P, : "11. � [0,1] where 
P,(z;) = p,; with I: p, .= l and p, .2:0. Similarly, a strategv for the buyer is a probability 
k 
distribution P, :  "11. � [0 ,1] for the buyer offers z 0, . • • •  , Zn.
Il.2 Equilibrium 
An equilibrium in this game is simply a pair of functions (P'.!'j Pt) such t hat P;' 
maximizes the seller's expected profits 7rsi 
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and Pi maximizes
rr, (P,IPi) = P, A ( PtJT 
subject to Psi20 and I: Psi = 1
"' (P,!Pi) = Pi B (P,)T 
subject to Pb; :O:O and L:; Pb; = 1
\vhere T denotes the matrix transpose.
We now state an obvious result for 1nixed strategy equilibria (indifference 1n payoff for 
all equilibrium messages) . 
{ k iff * Psi Lemma 1: ..A. (Pi) T = [ ",;] < k if * P.si 
{ iff * Pbi (Pi) 31 = [ Jr,;] < if * Pbi 
Let S={z; : P:; > O} and B={zj P:j > O} ,  then: 
Lemma 2,: S = B.
> 0 
=0 
>0 
=0 
Lemma 2 shows that there must be consistency in the offers of each "rival" or else one 
side can "take advantage" of the other in its mixed strategy. Lemma 2 also tells us that there 
are 2n+1-1 non-empty subsets of l that are potential equilibria to this game. Notice that 
Lemma 1 and 2 together tells us that we need only consider the reduced matrices of ..A. and 31
in which the rnws (and corresponding columns) of z, E l\S are eliminated. For each subset 11
of l, let ..A.11 and 3111 denote the reduced matrices to the subset 11. From Lemma 1 we need 
only consider the equations: 
..A.11 (Pt) T = K (2.1) 
(Pi) 3111 L (2.2) 
Where K and L are the appropriate dimensioned matrix of constants k and I respectively. 
Suppose ..A.11-1 and 31n -1 exist so that
(Pi) 'f = ..A.11-1 K (2.3) 
(Pi) = L 3111 -1 (2.4) 
, Since Pi(k) is a linear function of k and 2:= Pi;(k) = 1 ( there is only one k that will solve this
problem). Thus, for each k and I there is a unique pair (Pi(k) , Pi(/)) that solve (2.3) and
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(2.4) . All proofs in this paper will be supplied in the Appendix. 
Theorem l: There exists 2n+1-1 equilibria to the sealed-bid double auction under certainty
with offer grid of finesse n and failure cost c>O. 
Theorem 1 is an extension of the result found in Broman [1989]. The number of pure 
strategy equilibria is n (each element in 7L is an equilibrium) .  It is also the case that there is 
one equilibrium which spans the entire offers of "if_ (the completely mixed strategy equilibrium) . 
The probability for the mixed strategy equilibrium that spans "if_ (for the seller) is given by the 
algorithm (see Appendix for derivation) :  
n . II n-y+nc Po= . 1 j=l n-y+nc+3 
The limit as n-oo of the above probabilities exists \vith pi�O and p0___,.a(c)>0 .  
Figure 1 supplies a graph for different values of c as n gets large. 
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Unfortunately, extending the 1nodel to the case of continuous (or measureable) offer 
sets does not allow for completely mixed strategy equilibrium, even if positive probability can 
be placed on single offers. This condition follo\VS from the expected profit function of each 
player. Let f be the density of seller offers and g the density of buyer bids. Suppose f,g> 0 
(bounded and continuous) almost everywhere on [0,1], then profits are defined by: 
,,.,(f,a)= 
,,.,(g,/3)= 
1 1 
/f(x) {j g*(y)(x!y) 
0 x 
1 y 
x 
dy - c/g*(y) dy} dx
0 
1 
j g(y) {j f*(x)[l-(x!y)] dx - cf f*(x) dx} dy
y 0 0 
For f*,g* to be a Nash equilibrium we must have that for all offers x and y: 
1 x 
{j g*(y)
(x�y) d/3*(y) + J g*(y)( c) d/3*(y) } 
x 0 
y 1 
= k (2.5) 
{jr*(x)[l-
(x!y)] da*(x) + jr*(x)(-c) da*(x)} = I  (2.6) 
0 y 
The equations admit an integral (differential) equation--expand (2.6) and integrate by
parts and solve the resulting integral equation to obtain: 
F*(y le)= 
(c+I) 
(l+c-y)
y s 
-J 1 ds y J 1 dx 
1 ·{e 0
(1+c-s) }·{f (c + /) 
·{e0
2(1+c-x) } 
ds} 2(l+c-y) (1+c-s) 
0 
(2.7)
but F*(O) = 0 � i=-c which is not possible. It is obvious that this same contradiction will 
hold for any measureable subset of [0,1]. Adding positive probability to single offers only 
complicates the form (2.7), but the only solution is where f*,g* = 0 on measurable sets of 
offers. An example for the case where positive probability is placed on the 0 offer of the seller 
is given in the Appendix. For the remainder of this paper we \vill assume that bargaining 
institution restricts offers to a discrete grid and dispense with any further discussion of the 
continuous offer case. 
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ll.3 Equilibrium Selection 
To arrive at an optimal strategy (what to do in the one-shot game) the player rnust 
conjecture about the likelihood that his opponent \vill restrict his offer set to some subset of "?L. 
Thus, an equilibrium in conjectures is a set of of restrictions (conjectures) on '11.. \Vhere both 
players "agree" on their opponents choice of n. 
Definition : A conjecture is a n1apping C: '11.. 1--t !:Rn+i, \vhere C(Z)i is the conjecture that your 
opponent includes Z; in his offer set. A pair of conjectures [C(J'h,C(2'),] are said to be 
symmetric conjectures when C(J'),j = C(J'),n-j . 
Suppose the seller comes to a conclusion about C(Z)si• then the seller should realize, due 
to the symmetry of the payoffs, that the buyer would set C(J'hn-i=C(J'),i' Symmetric 
conjectures only support offer sets that are symmetric around �- Thus, the set of potential 
n n+l 
equilibria with symmetric conjectures is 22- 1 if n is even, 2-,-- 1 if n is odd. 
Proposition 1: The only syn11netric equilibriun1 in conjectures that is tretnbling hand perfect is 
vvhere both buyer and seller evenly split the surplus, i.e., the offers are � and �· 
Although this selection seems very appealing, it is not robust to changes in the 
bargaining grid and is insensitive to asym1netries in costs. For exa1nple, when � is not part of 
the offer set then this refinement clearly does not apply. Indeed there no trembling hand 
perfect symmetric equilibria in conjectures for this case. Furthern1ore, any of the pure 
strategies would seem hard to support \Vithout some sort of preplay communication. On the 
other hand, any mixed strategy based on a subset of offers will not be trembling hand perfect. 
If we restrict our attention to equilibria that result in symmetric payoffs, then symmetric pairs 
of offers will generate such payoffs (there are ¥ of these equilibria including the C.M.S. 
equilibrium). However, given that players plan to mix they have acknowledged that they have 
some uncertai_nty as to the strategy used by their counterpart. If players cannot rule out the 
possibility that an offer will be made they should utilize C.M.S.. The equilibrium yielded by 
C.M.S. is unique and worth a study. 
We now turn our attention to some comparative static results and investigate the case 
of known but differential bargaining costs. 
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II .4 Comparative Statics
Using the C.lvl.S equilibrium \Ve shall now investigate its expected profit/efficiency 
properties for differential cost structures and offer grids. 
Corollarv l: The probability that the seller (buyer) submits the lowest (highest) offer is 
increasing and concave in costs. 
Corollary J: Expected profits are increasing and concave in c {Chr/iJc > 0 and iJ27r/iJc2• Thus, 
the efficiency of the C.M.S. equilibrium increases as cost is increased. 
Figure 2 shows the efficiency of the C.M.S. equilibria for various values of c and n 
respectively. VVhile the results seen1 intuitive given the structure of the tnechanisn1, the 
following corollary provides a counterintuitive result of the C.M.S.,equilibrium. 
'-
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Corollarv ;i: Let Cs be bargaining cost of the seller and cb the cost of the buyer. Then, for 
cs>cb (cs<cb) we have 7rs>7rb (7rs<7rb)--if the failure cost of the seller is larger than that of the 
buyer then all sym1netric mixed strategy equilibria are such that the expected profits of the 
seller are greater than those of the buyer. 
The logic of the result in Corollary 3 follows from the fact that each player's 
equilibrium mixed strategy depends on the failure cost of his counterpart; if your rival has a 
lower failure cost than you, then in order to make him indifferent you must place a larger 
probability on your most stubborn offer. This result could be a feature of the one-shot nature 
of the game, or the fact that we have an environment \vith complete information. VVe \vill 
examine these issues later. We end this section with an analysis of the t\vo offer case. 
Example : the two offer case 
The payoff matrix for the seller is: Seller 
0
1
Buyer 
In equilibrium, the seller offers 1 with probability i+
'zc, and 0 with probability ,:��. 
The buyer offers 0 with -+' and 1 with probability 
1 2Cs 
2c, He11ce ti b b'l't tl1at a 1+2cs· 1e pro a 11 y 
bargain is struck is 1-( ( )1(l+· )); i+2cs 2Cb expected profits are � for each player. i+2c9 The 
comparative statics are illuminating: as c falls the probability of failure rises and in the limit 
when there no bargaining costs there are no bargains. Expected profits also fall as c falls and 
in the limit (costs are zero) profits are zero. Another case of interest is where cs=cb=� (costs 
are equal to the surplus), here the probability of failure remains high (�) and expect profits are 
only �- Hence, even when cost are equal to total surplus, fully half the surplus is consumed--in 
an expected sense--by bargaining. 
III . The Dynamic Game
Several problems have emerged from the analysis of the symmetric one-shot game. 
First, the expected profit of playing the game increases with costs. Second, the player with a 
higher cost obtains larger profits than the player with lower cost. One possible source of our 
counterintuitive result may have to do with the restriction that the game end after one period. 
1 1  
This section builds upon the previous ones and investigates the question of bargaining 
failures in a dynamic context. We will maintain that C.M.S. are chosen \Vhen anything is 
possible (recall that any collection of points or subset of [0,1] will yield an equilibrium in the 
one-shot game). One tnay wish to focus on pure strategies, but since in the discrete case the 
number of bargaining points is arbitrary, it is not clear ho\v the coordination proble1n would be 
solved. Given the significant probability of failure in the one-shot game equilibria, it is 
important to investigate how extending the length of play affects the efficiency of trading. 
Going from one period to a repeated game often allows simplification of the problem because 
delay may be used to communicate information, however this is not likely to be the case here 
because there is nothing to communicate. That is, in the complete infor1uation context, there 
is no information concerning individual payoffs to be discovered from failure or delay in 
reaching an agreernen t. 
Ill.l The Model
The dynamic version of the game is similar to the one described in Section II except 
that if the buyer price is lower than the seller price, the bargain fails and each player must pay 
c before the next round of offers are made. We will consider both the finite horizon game \vith 
a known ending point and the infinite horizon game (both with discounting). 
In the finite horizon case, \Vorking back\vards from any period ( t), the buyer and seller 
will play a game that is sin1ilar in payoff to the matricies in Section III, \Vhere the entries 
above the diagonal are the same but the entries below the diagonal are replaced by: V=b·Ilt-l_ 
c, where rrt-l is the expected value of the game in period t and f; is the discount rate. 
Theorem 1 tells us that for each subset of '1L there exists a unique equilibrium to this game. 
Infinite horizon games are more appealing than games with known-ending points 
because of the the nature of the process we seek to describe. In this game no surplus is 
consumed by failure, the mirage of profits remains the sa1ne1 independent of the number of 
times the players have failed to come to a bargain. In equilibriun1, expected profits must be 
strictly positive because each player can accept a zero share of the surplus. Any player who 
agrees to play- this-game will not want to stop until a bargain occurs. Thus, the only rational 
reasons for the game to end is a bargain, death, or some other unexpected event. Therefore, 
the assumption of an uncertain end to the ga1ne, or that the game will go on until the players 
strike a bargain is the most intuitive. 
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A strategv for the seller will be a function p; :7/_ x N � [0,1] where P,(z;,t) = P!;
where P!i is the probability that the seller offers zi in period t. Thus, V t we must have 
I:P!;=l and P!;�O. Similarly, a strategv for the buyer will be a function Pl:Z x N � [O,l ] 
representing the probability that the buyer offers zj in period t. 
V.2 Equilibrium and Equilibrium Selection 
A sequential equilibrium in this gan1e is a pair of sequences of functions (p�t)*,p�t)* ),
(t)* { '* t-1* } (t)* { '* t-1* '* where Ps = Ps , Ps .... and Pb == Pb , Pb .... }such for each t, Ps maximizes: 
t t (t-1)* (t-1)* t* T ;r, (P,) = P, .A(p, , Pb ) (Pb ) 
subject to I: P!;=l and P!;�O
and Pi* 1naximizes1 
t '* (t-1)* (t-1)* t T "' (P,) = P, � (p, , Pb ) (P,) 
subject to I: pi,=l and pi,�O 
(t-1)• (t-1)• 
Note: .A(p, , Pb ) is defined to be the matrix of payoffs for the seller that is identical to 
the matrix .A defined in Section III, except that below the diagonal the entries are the 
. . (t-1)• (i-1)• (t-1)• (t-1)• 
discounted expected returns 1n1nus c, if the players use ps and Pb . � (Ps , Pb )
is defined similarly. 
The sequences p! and p� are the n1ixed strategies of the players that are best responses 
for each subgame in the dynamic game. 'rhe strategies at time t are dependent on future 
actions because future actions drive the expected future profits and thus the continuation 
value of the game. Unlike the one-shot game where failure to agree lead to a loss there is no 
reason for the continuation value of the game (V) to be negative if discounted expected profits 
are higher than c. Thus, some individual rationality constraints may become binding because 
individuals have no incentive to demand less than the continuation value of the game. 
Intuitively, for a given set of offers Oi higher continuation values in period t decrease the 
expected returns of period t+l . Lower expected profits in period t+l decrease the continuation 
value of period t+� which will increase the expected return in period t+3 and so on. Thus the 
set of individually rational offers may change abruptly over time, a fact that poses further 
equilibrium selection problems. 
Given that there may be different sets of acceptable offers at different times1 we must 
select from the set of C.M.S. sequential equilibria the one which seems most plausible for each 
13 
period. If the set of individually rational offers shrinks for each period of backward induction, 
it is natural to eliminate the offers that would never be accepted. If the set of individually 
rational offers expands, the question arises as to which of the C.NI.S. equilibria will be selected. 
vVe select the C.M.S. sequential equilibria with the largest cardinality. This equilibrium has 
the property that any offer which is individually rational to accept in period t \vill be offered in 
period t with some (ho\vever low) positive probability. Moreover, the fact that in the future 
an offer will be unacceptable, or that it has been unacceptable in the past, should not influence 
today's decisions. As a result the C.M.S. are the intuitive extension of the equilibria examined 
in the one-shot game. Selecting the C.M.S. implies that if mtt > V > ';\!, then llt={ mt'. 
m+2 -n-· . , n-�-1. n-�-2}. 
It is easy to sho\v that there is a function which maps continuation values into 
equilibriu1n mixed strategies. Thus, for either the finite or infinite horizon game we can rewrite 
our equilibrium definition in terrns of continuation values instead of probabilities. Let 
II(n,m,V) be the expected profit from the C.M.S. equilibrium of the one-shot game with a grid 
of finesse A, smallest individually rational offer !.ff, continuation value V. 
Definition: An infinite horizon steady state C.M.S. sequential equilibrium to the bargaining game 
is a pair of values (Vi, Vi) such that : 
and 
V*- ' II ( V*) . 'h m V* m-1 s u· s n.111, s -c '\\. ere n> s >l'}, 
V* ' II ( V*) h m y'* m-1 b ::::::: u· bz n,m, b -c w eren> b >l'l· 
We should note that this definition is not exhaustive of C.M.S. sequential equilibria. In
fact any pair of sequences Vi={V'.;',. ... Vt}; Vi={V?,. ... v;1\ is an equilibrium if and only if
v(+1=8·II(n,m,Vfl-c for t in [O,T-1] and i=s,b. and V?=8·II(n,m,Vt)-c. 
n-m 
Proposition 2.: Over the interval [-oo, \¥], II(n,m,V)= TI 
j=m 
2n-2j-2n V (n-m V) .
2n-(2j-l)-2nV 11- +
v.
i) is continuous in V, ii) is decreasing in V, iii) is concave in V, and iv) has a
limit of 1ri_1 when V --+ 1ri_1 and equals � when V --+ -oo. 
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In other words the profit function is very well behaved. P roposition 2 \vill be enough 
to guarantee that the infinite hori zon equilibria exist. However, before discussing that issue we 
turn to the analysis of the finite horizon problem. 
III. 3 Equilibrium, Efficiency, and Convergence in the Finite Horizon Game
The significant probability of failure found in the one-shot game suggest that it may be 
individually rational for individuals to consume a greater part of the surplus attempting to 
appropriate the rest. This section makes clear that the incentives for stubbornness remain 
strong in most dynamic situations. Notice that if � is not part of the bargaining grid there
\.vill not exist a fully efficient symmetric equilibrium. So as not to entirely rule out efficient 
equilibria outright, we shall assume throughout that � is part of the offer grid.
Lemma J: If c>A there exist no C.M.S . equilibrium such that the gan1e achieves full efficiency,
regardless of the number of periods played. 
The interpretation of Len1ma 3 is rather simple. Niixed strategies imply a positive 
probability of failure, however, inefficiency in a dynamic game may not be significant provided 
that the costs of failure are small enough because future profits constrain the subset of 
individually rational offers n;. If future profits are high enough a unique individually rational
offer may subsist, however the range of costs where an efficient solution may occur is 
arbitrarily small even if players are perfectly patient. 
Proposition 3: V n and 8>0 there exists c such that 8· II(n,0,-c )-c>0.
Thus in any two period game the players will randomize on a different set in the first 
period than in the second. If c and 8 are small enough it is not rational for the seller to accept 
an offer of 0 because his continuation value is positive. Thus, let c1 be a solution to 6 · II(n101-
c1) = c1; such a solution exists since II(n,0,-c) is bounded above and 6 is less than 1.
Furthermore, since II(n,0,-c) is strictly concave and c1 < � , c1 is unique.
Theorem .Q.: For n=2, the game achieves full efficiency in two periods if c<c'. For n>2, the 
ga1ne does not achieve full efficiency in t\vo periods. 
Taken together, Lemma 3 and Theorem 5 suggest that except for n=2 (where the
discontinuities are most severe) the efficiency of the game will depend on bargaining costs. If
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costs are high ( c>c1) the one-shot game ts more efficient than any multistage sealed-bid double 
auction. If costs are small ( c< ft) then the game may achieve full efficiency if the horizon is 
long. In the intermediate case ( c1 >c> /t) the game \vill not achieve full efficiency and expected
p rofits \vill not be larger than the one-shot game provided the horizon is short. 
Beyond the question of efficiency, the model forces us to confront the problem of 
convergence. Built into the discrete problem are a set of discontinuities that may lead to 
chaotic continuation values. VVithin the interval [O,c'] there exist costs such that the finite 
game forces each player to dramatically alter his strategy fron1 one period to the next, even if 
many periods of play remain and players are not perfectly patient. As Figure 3 sho\vs, for 
n=lO, c=0.28, 5=1 .0 and t=l to T=600, each period of play has a specific continuation value 
and these values follow a chaotic pattern. A finite game will converge to the infinite horizon 
steady state based on nm if and only if V/.>Vt>�1 and W>Vt+l>�-1• This condition does 
not hold in general; thus it is not possible to give either conditions for chaotic behavior or 
convergence sitnply based on n ,  c and b. Indeed, for a wide range of costs the process fails to 
stabilize. Figure 4 provides a graph of expected profits for various cost at 100 and 200 periods 
to the end (T=600) .  For costs between .15 and .30 the process exhibits 1najor discontinuities 
in expected profits. 
The chaotic nature of the strategies displayed in Figure 3 could in fact be related to 
the convergence of i he finite game to an infinite horizon equilibriu1n \vhich is not a one period 
steady state but rather a pair of sequences. This possibility remains unexplored� because of 
the complexity of the strategies involved. l'vloreover, as the next section will show, many 
infinite-horizon-steady-state equilibria exist making the exploration of even rnore complex 
equilibria uninteresting. If the finite game had always converged to one of these, it would have 
resolved an equilibrium selection problem. That is not the case so we n1ust look elsewhere for 
an appropriate equilibrium. 
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Figure 3 
Continuation Values 200 periods from Horizon (n=lO, c=.28, D=l and T=600) 
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III.4 Equilibrium and Efficiency in the Infinite Horizon Game 
Infinite horizon equilibria are sin1ply the steady states for continuation values. Recall 
that c1 is the cost such that the continuation value of the game is zero if one period remains. 
For the infinite horizon game to be more efficient than the one-shot game the continuation 
value of the game must be positive. Thus c1 allows us to characterize the efficiency of the 
infinite horizon equilibrium when costs are "high". 
Proposition :!: For every n, 6 and c>c' there exist a unique V* and thus a unique infinite 
horizon equilibriun1 to the bargaining game. 
The bargaining game does not achieve full efficiency in an infinite horizon for c>c'. In 
addition, for c>c' the dynan1ic ga1ne is less efficient than the one-shot gan1e. The result is not 
surprising since the one-shot game is the equivalent of committing not to return to the 
bargaining table in case of failure. As a result, equilibrium strategies inust be less stubborn, 
and hence the probability of failure falls. 
Theoren1 Q.: If c< c1 , at least one infinite horizon equilibrium exists. Further1nore, the number 
of infinite horizon equilibria is at nlost � +i. 
Given c, a C.M.S .  infinite horizon steady state equilirium based on f2m will exist only if 
d · Il(n ,m ,V)-c>m�l . Since Il(n ,m,V)  is maximized over the interval [m�1 ,Jft] at the point
V=m�l , a necessary condition for the existence of such equilibria is II(n,m,�;1)-c>mr{ l. 
Proposition Q.:
If , for a given c, II(n,m,mr{l )-c<11�1 then II(n,1n+l ,-\¥)-c<-\¥. Thus, for a given c, if a
C .NI .S .  infinite horizon steady state equilibrium based on Orn does not exists then no such 
equilibrium based on f21n+l \Vill exist.
Proposition §.: I f  c< 5� then the infinite horizon game and the finite horizon game have an
efficient C.M.S .  equilibrium . 
We conclude this section \Nill analysis of the two offer case for the infinite horizon 
game. 
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Example (Two offer case): 
The seller would like to maximize (at t = 0): 
V9(p )=pq( 0.5)+(1-p )q +( 1-p )(  1-q)( 6 · V)-c) ( 3.1) 
where p is the probability that the seller offers 0 and q is the probability that the buyer offers 
1, and V1 is the continuation value of the game if there is a bargaining failure. Differentiating
(3.1) yields 
0 0i;,' = q(0.5) - q - (1 - q)(ov: - c) = 0
or 
- _q_ = s. v; - c2(1-q) (3.2) 
Equation (3.3) leads to the conclusion t hat the discounted continuation value of the ga1ne 
(8·\';) must always be less than c .  No\V, in equilibrium p=q and v; = v9 so that substituting
(3.2) into (3.1) we find: 
-oq2 + q(l + 6 + 2c) -2c = 0 (3.3)
Equation (3.3) is a quadratic equation (in q) that is negative at q=O and positive at q=l; the
maximum of the function occurs at q = 1+;t2c> l .  Thus, (3.4) is strictly increasing on the
interval [0,1] and therefore there is a unique solution to this proble1n. VVe now state son1e 
results we can derive directly from ( 3.3): 
(1) As costs (c) increase the probability of failure (1 - q)2 falls so the game ends sooner.
(2 - 2q*)Reason: 8q/8c = > 0 - q increases and thus (1 - q)!. 
(1 + 6 + 2c - 62q*)
(2) As t he discount rate rises the p robability of failure increases. 
( •2 *)Reason: oq/86 = q - q < 0 
( 1 + 5 + 2c - 62q *)
(3) When 6=0 we return to the one-shot game and q = 1 Jc2c . 
Thus, in the complete information game (with an infinite horizon and two offers) the 
unique symmetric equilibrium has delay (q < 1) and this delay rises as the cost of bargaining 
falls and the impatience of the players rises. Unless there is a more "suitable" negotiating 
mechanism or institution there may be no way for the players to resolve their differences 
instantaneously. Most of the surplus is in fact consumed in the bargaining process. 
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IV. Asymmetric and Uncertain Costs
The symmetric cost case, although informative, cannot provide the whole ans\ver to the 
issue of negotiation failure. Clearly cost are not strictly symn1etric. One disturbing 
phenomenon in this setting is that profits increase with costs. Thus, the higher cost player has 
a higher expected profit than the lower cost player. \,Ye now extend the model in Section II by 
having each player's cost drawn independently from a common distribution. 
IV.1 The Model
Suppose c is dra\vn from a common density function f( · ) ,  with cu1nulative density F( · )
on the support [f,c]. A strategv for the seller is a function P,:[f,c]xZ � [0,1] where P,(c,z,) = 
P,;(c) and P,;(c) is the probability that a seller of type c offers z,. Similarly, a strategv for the 
buyer is a function P, : [<;,c] x l! � [0,1] where Pb;(c) is the probability that a buyer of type c 
bids zj . 
IV.2 Equilibrium
The profits for a buyer of type c of offering � given t he strategy of the seller are: 
A i 2n-2i-i+j n � · 
7r;,(c!c)  = L P,;(c) ? -1:: P,j(c) c and thus the expected profits from offering� are: 
j=O �n j=i+1
i 
I: 
j=O 
2i+ n-j-i
2n 
c 
{ jP.; (c) f(c) de}
<; 
(c) f(c) de ( 4.1)
For a seller of type c1 the expected profits of an offer of n�j can be described by: 
n 
I: 
i=j
c 
2i+
2�-j-i {j Pbi (c) f(c) de}
<; 
j-1 
;" 
c1• ,L Pbi (c) f(c) de
1=0 <:: 
( 4.2) 
Thus, an equilibrium is a pair of functions P;(c), P;(c) such that P;(c) maximizes P ,(c) 
II(P;(c)), where II(P;(c)) is a lxn vector whose ith entry is 7r;,(P,jc); P:'(c) maximizes P,(c)
Il(P;(c)) , where II(P',(c)) is a lxn vector whose jth entry is 7r,;( P,j c).
Since ,,.,,(P,j c) and ";,(P,I c1) are linear functions of c and c1 respectively, equations 
( 4 .1 )  and ( 4.2) can be rewritten as: 
(4.3) 
( 4.4) 
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Notice that Jr;o(·) and";,(·) are linearly decreasing functions of c. If rri,(c)<ir,,(c)
and i>j then a seller of type c will have a dominant strategy of playing i \vith zero probability, 
and all sellers \vith higher cost \vill have san1e dominant strategy. If f( · ) is continuous, then 
for almost every c one 7r sjC c) will be larger than all the other 7r si( c) ,  so ahnost all players \Vill 
have pure strategies. 
Proposition 7: The best response function is decreasing in c; if 7ri(c)> ;rrk(c) for k>i, then V C 
> c, ir; (c )> "k(c) for k>i. 
Thus, if a player of type c n1akes a demand of � ' all players of type C > c \vill 1nake a
demand of no more than h· I-Ience, we can restrict our attention to strategies where the
de1nanded share of the surplus decreases \vith cost. Such strategies are co1npletely defined by 
a vector of ''cut-off points", r =[-y1, �12, •.•. ,/n] \vhere � :S "Yi :::; C for the buyer and a vector of 
"cut-off points'',.!\_ =[A.1, >..2 , .•.• ,.An] \vhere �::;Ai:s;c for the seller .. t\. seller (buyer) with a cost of 
c between Ai and >..i+l \Vill den1and �- Thus, a cut-off point \vill be a function >..i : �n r---;. 3f and
thus A : !Rn ,._. 3�n .
We note that best responses do not require that every offer be submitted with positive 
probability, so that offers may be skipped. Ho\vever, the buyer and seller profit functions are 
continuous in c and the best response function is the 1naximum of ;rib( C) over n. Since the 
maximum of continuous function is continuous, Ai*(·) is continuous. Thus, an equilibriu1n to 
the asymmetric inforn1ation ga1ne is defined as a pair of functions (i\ * ,r*) such that A*(
r')=A' and r*(A')=( f1). We shall say that a symmetric equilibrium to this game occurs iff 
A *(A')= A1• 
Proposition .8_: 
A) Symmetric equilibria exist.
B )  \I f( · ) and every pair of symmetric offers 3 a unique equilibrium 
C) In any symmetric equilibrium ir,(c) > ir,(c1 ) if c< c1•
Theorem I: �f c is_ drawn from a uniform distribution over the interval [c;,C], c; > 0 , then 3 a 
unique equilibrium set of cut-off points{>.;", .... ,>.�} such that�< >.'!'< . . . . .  < >.� < c. 
Part 3 of Proposition 8 shows that, unlike the certainty case, higher cost players obtain 
lower expected returns from the game. However, failures in the negotiation process do not 
appear to be caused by the uncertainty of bargaining costs. Delay occurs because players 
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compete for a larger share of the surplus. Hence the process still results in inefficient 
outco1nes. It is clear that these same results will hold for the special case in which one of the 
players cost is kno\vn to all with certainty \vhile the other player dra\VS his cost from a known 
nondegenerate distribution. 
VII. Conclusion
This paper has attempted to analyze bilateral bargaining under the sealed-bid double 
auction \vhen there is co1nplete information concerning individual payoffs and bargaining costs. 
Unfortunately, in this environment there exists a multiplicity of equilibria. All of the equilibria 
suffer from unsatisfactory properties; the pure strategy equilibria require coordination and are 
not sensitive to bargaining costs ( including focal equilibria--equal split ) ; mixed strategy 
equilibria are not trembling hand perfect. Because the traders are arguing over surplus, it is 
rational to accept any offer, thus \Ve focused on co1npletely mixed strategy equilibria but find 
that such equilibria require that the negotiator with the higher bargaining cost receive higher 
profits. 
Allowing the bargaining process to be dynamic does not entirely solve the problems of 
the one-shot game. The continuation value of the game and thus the offers in the dyna1nic 
game can demonstrate chaotic behavior because of the discontinuities of the bargaining grid. 
�1Ioreover \Vhen the failure costs are less than half the surplus, there 1nay exist n1ultiple infinite 
horizon C.M.S. equilibria. When costs are n1ore than half the surplus, however, the dyna1nic 
game is well behaved (the finite game converges to the unique steady state equilibrium) but 
the multistage ga1ne equilibria are less efficient than one-shot game equilibrium. 
These results seem rather negative and not very reassuring. Yet, unlike the Stahl­
Rubinstein model we find that there is significant probability of delay, a property of the 
equilibrium which is consistent with empirical reality. As bargaining costs fall, the mixed 
strategy equilibriu1n approaches a pure strategy in which failure occurs with probability one. 
This suggests that failure costs play an important role in bringing the parties closer to 
agreement, and that one should focus on the determinants of bargaining costs to understand 
the success or failure of negotiations. In the dynamic version of this game efficiency can be 
increased (provided c<c') and inefficiency conditions are parameter sensitive. Thus, the 
comparative static results of the model have some appeal. Recently, Currie and McConnell 
[1990] have supplied a comparative (empirical) study of compulsory arbitration with right to 
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strike rules and found that while arbitration increases the number of disputes, the total delay 
costs are lower under arbitration with no significant difference in the final wage package. 
These results suggest that bargaining costs and delays are significant factors in bargaining. 
We have made bargaining costs exogenous in our model, but it is clear that these costs are 
artifacts of the bargaining institution and as such should be explicitly inodel as part of the 
ga1ne. VVe leave this point as a next step in the research of the sealed-bid double auction. 
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Appendix 
Proofs 
Proof of Theorem 1: 
.i\11 that is required is to sho\V that ..A.0 is invertible because that will lead to a unique
solution for Pb . Note that .A.0 is a matrix with an upper triangle of positive constants and a
lower triangle with -c. The determinant of .A0 will be a polynomial of degree 1'21-1. In 
particular, the determinant of .A0 (det[.A0]) is given by:
det[.A0] = � (sgn ") a11T(i)"'am1T(m)' (A) " 
where m=l'21 and 1T are a permutations on the elements of .A0. We shall now show that
det[.Ao] > 0. The permutation ir(i)=i results in the product of the diagonal elements, D:;>O. 
Next, the pern1utation \Vh�re two of the elements of ..A.0 are reversed, i.e. ;r(i)=j and 1r(j)=i, 
results in an odd number of inversions _,.(sgn 7r) = -1. From Equation A, this term in the sum 
is given by (-1) ·-c ·b(ir) where b(ir) is a nonnegative number. At least one of the two elements 
permutations will be strictly positive. Continuing with the per1nutations \Vhere three element 
positions are reversed the sgn 1T for these will 1. These permutations will be given by (1) · - (c)2 
b2(n) where b2(ir) is a nonnegative number. At least one of these will be strictly positive. We
. . . a(JT) P(r) can contrnue t his argument to obtarn elements of the form (-1) · (-c) · bm(r) where
bm(JT)>O,  and a(r) and P(ir) are either both odd or both even. Thus, det[.A0] will be the sum
of nonegative terms (at least one of which is strictly positive) so that det[.A0] >0. ".Bo has the 
same properties as .An.
Since the above argue1nent holds for any subset n of l \Ve have 2n -1 Nash equilibria
to this game.D 
Algorithm for Computing P:f 
The difference in expected profits to the buyer from offering zi versus zi+l is: 7f i b
n-i-1 
l "' ' 211 � Pj · The incentive compatibility constraints require that the j=O 
expected profits of all offers must be equal when players mix. Thus rrib - rri_1b=0, which is
n-i-1 
. 1 ' 1 "' ' eqmva ent to: p · = (' 2. 2 ) L, P; · n-1 _n- i+ nc j=O Note that if c=-� the equation is undefined but we
assumed that c \Vas positive. We can write down \Vhat the equilibrium probabilities are solely 
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as a function of Pn s as follows: 
P18= 
1 
Po' (2n-2+2nc) 
P?s= �-��_, p ' - (2n-4+2nc) 0 
1 2n-1 +2nc 
-(02c-n- 4�+�_7?n-c�) 2n-2 + 2nc 
similarly 
1 2n-3+2nc 
P 3 s = -_�? n.,--'6� +cc2" n'"'c 2n-4 + 2nc 
by induction 
2n- 1 +2nc 
2n-2+2nc 
i-1 
Pis= 2n-2i+2nc . TI 
J=l 
2n-{2j-1 )+2nc s 
2n-2j+2nc Po 
' Po 
n 2n-(2j-1 )+2nc Now we can solve for Po because all the probabilities must add up to one or IT
n 
p0= 1 . Hence Po= f1 
j=l 
2n-2j+2nc l fi f ��77-��- \V iich is al\vays de ined or c>O. 2n-(2j-1 )+2nc 
I Example of F* for F*(O)=a>OI 
j=l 
VVe can obtain the follo\ving equations to solve for our distribution F*: 
y 
I=  j f*(x)[l-xt1J<lx + �
0 
y 1 
I= ff*(x)[l-xtlJ<lx - cJf*(x) dx 
0 y 
so that 
co 
f F*(s) ds = 2/ - a 
0 
and
y 
F* 
_ 
I + c -a(�) 
(y)- (1 + c -y) 2(1 +
l 
c - y) f F*(s) ds0 
Thus obtaining two equations and two unkno\Vns (a,/):
I+  c 
l + c = a  
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2n-2j+2nc 
1 
f F*(s) ds = 2/ + a 
0 
which has only one solution: a=/=1, but this cannot be an equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
We know that Sl ={�} is a sy1nn1etric equilibrium in conjecture. When a buyer
contemplates his equilibriun1 strategy given that the other player plays a given equilibrium 
strategy based on n he is indifferent between Inaking all offers in n. If we assume that his 
opponent can tremble between a mixed strategy over n and making any offer wen the buyer 
strictly prefers offering w with probability one. In fact w is a best response to any equilibrium 
strategy as long as wEO. Hence, given n, only those equilibria where both player adopt pure 
strategies are trembling hand perfect. Among the pure strategy equilibria only fl= H} is
symmetric in conjectures .D 
[ Proof of Corollary 1: 
()2 
It is obvious that f) P?o > o. 
,-
n- 1 
= ap0{ /"£, 
i=D 
n- 1 1 '°' 2i+2c } 
(2i+2c)(2i+1+2c) � {2i+2c)2(2i+1 +2c/2 
n-1 
Qi <O iff (2i+2c)(�i+l +2c) . I: J=i+l 
1 
<
2i+2c 
{2i+2c)(2i+l +2c) {2i+2c)2 {2i+l +2c /2 
Notice that Qn_1<D and 
n-1 
(2j+2c)(2j+i+2c) <IT (2j+2c}(2j+1 +2c)'=. B1
j=i+l 
An_2 = (2n-3+2c) {2n-4+2c) < {2n-1+2c) (2n-2+2c)= Bn_2 
Assume A.< B. then ' ' 
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n-1 
Bi_1=(2i+2c) (2i+l+2c) II (2j+2c)(2j+l+2c) =(2i+2c) {2i+l+2c)Bij=i+l 
Ai-l= (2i-1+2c) LIT (2j+2c)(2j+1+2c} l=ijf=I 
Ai_1= (2i-1+2c) {(2i+2c)(2i+1+2c) � IJ /=,+1 jcpl 
n-1 
(2j+2c){2j+J+2c} +
. II (2j+2c)(2j+1+2c}}J=i+l 
n-1 
= (2i-J+2c) { (2i+2c)Ai +.TI 
(2j+2c)(2j+1+2c}}
1=i+l 
= (2i-1+2c) { (2i+2c)Ai +ai} 
n-1 
Therefore, 2= Qi <0 D j=O 
[ Proof of Corollary 2:
For the seller we have 
{2n-2i+I+2c) II
n 2n-2j+2c 
(2n-2j+l+2c) J=i+l 
and (2n-2i+2c) (2n-2i-l +2c) Pi 
8pi-l fJpi (2n-2i+2c)2 ---r.r;;- =-----a;- {2n-2i+ 1 +2c )(2n-2i-l +2c) +2Pi 
( 2n-2i+ 1 +2c )-(2n-2i+2c)
(2n-2i-1+2c}2 
f)pi {2n-2i+2c)2 2pi ---a:;- (2n-2i+l +2c)(2n-2·i-1 +2c) +. . ') (2n-2i-1+2c)-
()pi · · Ovi-1 B d fi . b So -8 >0 implies - 8- >0. uyer expecte pro its are given y:c c 
n 
IT
b 
0 = L (0.5 -k)p5 i so that 
i=O 
fJII' 0 
-a;-
f)pS. fjpS. We know 3 j ?e su�h that Be i <O if i?_j and Be• >0 if i<j, hence,
Since L p15 i=l we have 
i=O 
� 8ps i =D - {=-!. 8ps i = - � 8ps i ."--' fJ c .L.. fJ c L, fJ' i=O i=O i=J 
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arr' 0 n i ,aPs i I: Ops i 2= (0. 5  � (0. 5  -,;.)a;: > i=O 8 c i=O 
that expected profits are concave in c. 
We shall show that 
8pi -- > 0  implies i) c 
j- 1 -nJ 
_ f: aP:i i 
. oc t=O 
- I: op';(0. 5 -hJ - . 0 o c•= 
a n- 1 
a
pi
c = 2p ,
{"". �- �-��)-c(l����) • � (2n-2J+2c 2n-2j+l +2c, • + l  
1 } - ' p [A-Bf and (2n-2i+l +2c) - - i 
n-1 n-1 
_ { ""' 1 _ 1 '- ""' 4i + 1 +4c + - 4Pi (� (2i+2c)(2i+ 1 +2c) (2n-2i+I +2c) } . � (2i+2c)2(2i+ l +2c)2 J=i + l  J=i+ l  
1 We shO\.V " >0 now 
since op . -'- > O  a ,  -+ A > B  and hence 2B2 -2AB < O  (by the same argument as in  the concavity of Po 
D>A2 ), 
o'p so 8 c2 
so that 
Now 
<D if 
n 
Notice that 
(2n-2i+2c)2 
{2n-2i+l +2c)(2n-2i-l +2c) 
II' o = L {0. 5  -�)PS i 
i=O 
arr' 0 
� 
(2n-2i+2c)2 
(2n-2i+l +2c)(2n-2i- 1 +2c) 
i)p . 1 P ·  +a-' --�--� -a ' 8c {2n-2i- 1 +2c)2 (2n-2i-1 +2c)3 
<O if i<j , 
2pi + . ? (2n-2i-1 +2c)� 
if i>j and 
. 32 ' J-1 p i . (O. s  -n- )� if i <J. Agarn uc· 
()2 ps .
s o  L a 2 i =40, s o  that i=O c 
1- 1 a' , ""' p i 
-� 
8 c2 i=O 
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j-l .:i2 s  . j-l ::.i2 s  . 
Hence " u p . J-1 " u p . J < .L 8c2 i {0 .5  -n) - -� 8c2 t (0.5 -n) = t=O i=O 
j-1 .:i 2  s " u p .  
L 8 2
1 
i=O c 
I Proof of Corollary 3:
Since profits are increasing rn c it follows directly t hat the player with the higher cost will 
obtain a larger expected profit relative to the player with the smaller bargaining cost.D 
Proof of Proposition 2 :  
We can characterize expected profits of this game as follo'.Vs: II (n ,n1,V) = (1-pm)V + Pnin�m 
rearranging terms leads to II (n,m,V)=V + Pm(11;,m-V), but ,
we have, 
2n-2j-2n V 
2n-(2j-1)-2nv· 
Thus
II ( n,m,V)  = 
nhm o 2rt2j-2r V (n;,m-V) + V
J=m :.n- 2j-1 -2n V 
i) The profit function will be continuous if Pm is continuous. Since Pm a product of ratios
whose numerators and denon1inators are all continuous in V, with denominators that are 
strictly positive for all V less than rn/n, Pn• is continuous in V. 
ii) Let us first evaluate the first partial of Pm with respect to V
or 
8pm 
av = 
n ( T1 
j= 1 
n 
(2n-(2j-1)-2nVJO::: f1 ( 2n-2i-2nV) 
i=l i#j 
n 
n ( f1 2n-(2j-1)-2nV)2
j=l 
I: ([1 2n-(2j-1)-2nV)(f1 2n-2j-2nV)
i=l j,t i  j #i 
(TI 2n-(2j-1)-2nV)2
j=l  
op n-1 1 "V
m =- 2n Pm. 2::: �����=��� <O u J=l (2j+l)-2nV)(2j-2nV) 
·
n n 
([1 2n-2j-2nV)(I; f1 2n-(2i-1)-2nV) 
i=l j=l i#j 
n 2 ( f1 2n-(2j-1)-2nV) 
j=l 
The same method can be used to show that for all other offers in  Ui\\ n;,m] 
8p iJv >o for i> 1
Now recall that by incentive co1npatibility 7rn=7r0 •  Note that the coefficients of the 
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first row of the payoff matrix are all positive, independent of the value of v. W1oreover Pm is 
the coefficient of the last entry in each ro\v. In the first ro\v the last entry is always �-­
corresponding to buyer sending 1 and seller sending 0. In tlie first row all entries are in [O,�]; 
putting less weight on � \vhile increasing the weight of all other offers 1nust decrease profits. 
Thus Pm decreases when V goes up, and so do profits. 
82II(n,m,V) ( C II )iii) This follows directly from the fact that 
ac' 
<0 see oro ary 1 .
n-m
iv) When V=m/n we have II(n,m,V) = fI 
product (j=n-m) is zero so that II(n,m,V) 
j
�W
n-J-m (n-�m) + n n+l-m m 
n-rn 
Recall that Pm=: fI 
J=In 
2n-2j-2n \l 
2n-(2j-1 )-2nV" 
N O\V as \! goes to min us infinity
The last ter1n of this 
2n-2j-2n V 
2n-(2j-1 )-2nV 
goes to 1
for each j. So Pm+l goes to 1 this implies that 7rm(V) goes to � when v goes to - oo . Because 
we look at mixed strategy equilibria the profits of offering f{;_ are equal to expected profits.D 
Proof of Lemma 3:
The game achieves full efficiency if and only if the players each send l· If they fully
randomize this can only occur if all the other offers are dominated or if V= 8Il-c>�-ft . Now,
II(n,m,V)< l because of individual rationality (since the seller offers 'f: with positive 
probability and the expected profits from such an offer are at most j .  In a mixed strategy 
equilibrium, expected profits are equal for all offers, thus profits are at most �) . So for the 
ga1ne to achieve full efficiency c cannot be greater than ft.o 
Proof of Proposition 3:
First evaluate II(n,0,-c) -c at c= A. It is easy to show that p0(kJ> l so II(n,O,k) -c >�-;. In 
fact, b·II(n,O,�) -c>O for 8 >n'.1 • Because profits are linear in 8, [n'.1 '  1] <:;; �(n).D 
Proof of Theorem 5:
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The proof involves four steps. VVe must eliminate the possibility that V>�- 1  i n  the second �n 
period. So we must investigate \vhether it is possible for II(n,0-c) than 1�- l -c .�n 
1) if c>A use Corollary 3.
2) for n>3 if c<A then Po < \  and p0(n,AJ < p0(4 ,�) for n>4. Now, p0(4,� )::'.  0.2251
<0.5 so ll(n,0,-c) -c=( l- Po(n,A) )-c+ p0(n,A) -c <\- �c. Thus, l- �c > l- A iff c <3'n· So the
two period game will not achieve full efficiency if c is less than 32n.
3) if c<21n note that p0(n,2�) < p0(4,�) </1i for all n>4.
Thus II(n,0,-c) -c<fo- He 
but {o- �c< �- A for all c>O if n>4 
If 4 1 1 1 d 3 1 7 > 1 "ff < 1 < 1 - 1 n= 2- n =4 an iO- 10c 4 1 c 3 4 32 - s n  
p0( 4,f,) <0.09 so for c < f, 
II(n,O,c) -c<fo- �c which is always less that � - Again if c< 21n the tv.ro period game
does not acheive full efficiency. 
4) All that remains unaccounted for are the cE[dri,3�J
Note again that p0(n,3�i ) < p0(4,f2) <� for all n>4. 
c>l.. thus ll(n c) -c<L -'-2n ' 3 6n 
Thus for all n>3 the game never achieves full efficiency in t\vo stages. For n =3, � is not
in the offer set so the game cannot achieve full efficiency over sym1netric mixed strategies. D 
I Proof of Proposition 4: l 
We shall show that rr1> llt> ll� . Note that ll ' (n,c) =111 (n,V)= 111(n ,8·llt+i(n.c)-c). Now note
that 8 ·ll'+'(n.c)>0 so V>-c which implies that IT'(n,c) <111 (n,c) because profits are increasing 
in costs and therefore decreasing in V and for t>2 llt- l (n,c) <111 (n ,c). This leads to V(c,llt-1 )
< V(11 1 ) and thus ll'(n ,c) > 112(n ,c). So rr00must belong to [112 , 111] if it exists. A solution
exists because II(n,O,V) is continuous for �+ . Uniqueness is easy because II(n,V) is strictly
increasing in c and thus decreasing in V. Thus there must exist a V such that V=II(n,O,V)­
c.D
32 
Proof of Theorem 6: 
The proof of the Theorem follo\VS from our equilibriu1n selection. Note first that given a cost c 
players \vill use the n1ixed strategy based on Dm if and only if ¥{-> V> n�l i in this range
fI (n,m,V) is a continuous decreasing function of V thus 6II(n,m,V)-c will also be a decreasing 
continuous function of V. So there is at most one solution to the problem 8II(n,m,V)-c-V=O 
which is the fixed point condition for an infinite horizon equilibrium. A solution to the 
problem will exist if 8 · II(n,m, n;�1)-c > m�l but II(n,m, m�l) < 1/2 so a solution may not exist
except for m=O. There may also exist solutions for m=k, (kE {k ;  . . . ;U provided that c<
n-k+l 0
2n · 
Proof of Proposition 5 : _] 
IT ( m- 1) _ m-1 (m-l)n-2m+l n,m, n - n +Pm n n 
II ( m) m (m)n- 2m- 1n,rn+l,71 = rt +Pni+I rt --n-
n-m+2 
II 
m+l 
2i-2m 2 4 §. 2n-4ni+4
(2i+l-21n) =s · s  1 ' " 2m-4m+5
n-m+l 
Pm {
m
;-
1) 
= II 2i-2m _;?. 1_ 6 2n-4m+4 2n-4m+6 2n-4m+8 (2i+l-2m) -3 ·5  7 . . .  2m-4m+5 "2n-4m + 7 2n-4m+9
m 
Let k=n-2m so that 
IT ( m- 1) m- 1 (m- l)k+l m-1 d (m-l)k+l  (m .k-1 h If n,m,r:;:- = rr;- +Pm 71 � <-----n-- +c  a.n Prn -n --n>Pm+l n)---:;r,- t en 
IT( m) m ,m)k-1 m n, m + l, n  = n +Pm+I \ Ti"  """'Ti:" < n +c 
2k+7 2k+9 
o r 2k+6 . 2k+B 
k· l  <k+ l ,  o r
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(2k+ 7)(2k+9)(k- 1)<(2k+6) (2K+8)(k+l) which is equivalent to
Proof of Proposition 6:
1 k h , 'll · l (" {n-2 1 n+2} V Let us oo ' at the case \V ere only three of1ers are st1 rat1ona � '= 211 ; 2 ;  2n , >
'1;,4 and d=1) .  Then II(V,c) = p0(V)·(n2t2-V) + V. For an efficient C .M.S .  Equilibrium it
must be rational for the seller to refuse any 
th n-2 (V) (n+2 V) + V . n-2 an "'2rl '  or p0 
• """"2ll- -c >211· 
offer less than l · So II(V,c)-c must be greater 
Because Proposition 2 showed that II(V,c) is
decreasing in V, we only need to evaluate II(V) at (�;,4),  that yields the condition: 
(n-4)  (n+2 n-4) + n-• 1 1 Th t d '  · · · 1 ( (n-4)  ) ( 1 )  N' Po 2ll · 2n - 2n :::n -c > 2 - n ·  a con it1on is equ1va ent to 3·p0 2Il -1 · IT > c. l 'OW
p0(��14 ) = fg )  that implies that c tnust be less than 5°ii for the gan1e to have a C .NI .S .E .  that is 
efficient. It is easy to check that if 0 is of cardinality greater than 3 then c must be even 
smaller. D 
Proof of Proposition 7 :
The best response function is  decreasing in c iff c>c1 and V j>i  7rb1(c1) > 1rbi(c1) in1plies 
rrbi(c) 2'. rr,;(c). 
Assu1ne that c>c' and A is a best response for a player of type c' or:
, ' A A , A A ' A A A A 
rr,;(c ) 2'. 7rbj(c ) or A;  - B, . c 2'. Aj - Bj 'c \I j . Furthermore \I j>i  A; > Aj and B ;  > Bi .
, ' A  A A A A A  A A ' 
But, rr,;(c ) 2'. "';(c ) and A;  > A; and B ;  > B; imply B; - B; '.':: (A; - A; )c . However, if 
c>c1 then Bj - B; '.':: (A; - A ;)c, so the best response of a player of type c will be less than or 
equal to /i.D 
Proof of Proposition 8 
A) let C be the set defined by '!; '.':: !; iff i>j and \: :':: l; :'::i.: .  Clearly C is bounded and C is
closed because it contains its boundary. lVIoreover it is easy to show that C is convex. r*( · )
maps C into C continuously. Therefore a fixed point exists. Note that this does not prove that 
C .M.S .  equilibria exist for every n and every distribution function. 
B )  the possible offers are now 0 and 1 and thus 
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c c 
" 1 b(Ps l  c )  = l{  I P,o(c) f(c) de
<; 
- cf p81(c) f(c) de}
<; 
c 
"ob(P, I  c) = 0.5{ I P,o(c) f(c) de}
<; 
however, in equilibrium bbest responses are monotonic so 3 >. such that 
" 1 b(P, I c) = lF(,\) - c[l-F(,\)]
ir0b(P, I  c) = 0.5F(A)
At a cost of ,\ the buyer and the seller are indifferent between the offers they make so that: 
F(,\) -,\[1-F(,\)] = 0.5F(,\) � 
F(,\) = ,\+"o.5 . Since F(,\) I and F(<;) = O ;  F(c)=l and ,\ +\.5 is decreasing in 1 (and less 
than 1 at C)  a unique solution \Vill exist. 
C) follows directly from Propostion 7.0
Proof of Theorem 7
In equilibrium the set of cut-off points must be such that a player's difference in expected 
profit from offering i versus i+l is 0. Thus, with a uniform distribution we must solve the 
following set of i= l ,  .... n equations: 
(,\. -,\. 1),\ l+ l - (c - ,\. ) .)1 = o (i) I 1- 11- I � ll
where Ao = <;. Using equation (1) of the ,n equatidns allows to solve for An in terms of >.1 
and obtain: 
c (l  + 2n<;) * _ ( *) _ and at ,\1= (1 + 2nc) = a <c we have ¢n a = c.
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Next v..'e go to equation n and plug in ¢n( )  and solve for ,\_n-i-in terms of A1 :
Notice that · 1 <0 "' ( )l"n-1 ; Y'n-1 c 
Going to equation (2) we find: 
¢ ( A  ),\  + ·" . 
¢ ( ,\ ) = n-1 1 1 2n 2 1  . I A ) + l l"n- 1' 1 2n 
It is easy to show that qi2( .\1 ) > .\1 ( for ,\l <c) ,  and ¢2(a*) < c .  With these terms and
conditions we can continue this process to find: 
Al< 'h < «'i+l <c .
For n odd we will end at the n!l equation and find:
Now, when A l = <;, ¢* = oo; when ¢n+iCA i ) = ¢n+l ( A1) ,  ¢* < 0 ,  after which ¢*1> 0 with
:2 -2--1 
q) (c )  > 0 .  Thus, there are two .\1 's that solve the above equation--but only one solves allows
for \<\+i · The proof is similar for n even. D
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Below are the graphs for n=5 and c with the interval [ .25, .75] .
. 7 5  
0 
- . 1 5 
. 3 0 
. 7 5 
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